Coverart for item
The Resource Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit, Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber

Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit, Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber

Label
Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit
Title
Fragile by design
Title remainder
the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit
Statement of responsibility
Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
"Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries--but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents due to unforeseen circumstances. Rather, these fluctuations result from the complex bargains made between politicians, bankers, bank shareholders, depositors, debtors, and taxpayers. The well-being of banking systems depends on the abilities of political institutions to balance and limit how coalitions of these various groups influence government regulations. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation. Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why some endure while others are undermined, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues." -- Publisher's description
Member of
Cataloging source
WAL
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Calomiris, Charles W
Dewey number
332.109
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorDate
1957-
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Haber, Stephen H.
Series statement
The Princeton economic history of the Western world
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Banks and banking
  • Bank failures
  • Credit
Label
Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit, Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 507-548) and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
If stable and efficient banks are such a good idea, why are they so rare? -- The game of bank bargains -- Tools of conquest and survival : why states need banks -- Privileges with burdens : war, empire, and the monopoly structure of English banking -- Banks and democracy : Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -- Crippled by populism : U.S. banking from colonial times to 1990 -- The new U.S. bank bargain : megabanks, urban activists, and the erosion of mortgage standards -- Leverage, regulatory failure, and the subprime crisis -- Durable partners : politics and banking in Canada -- Mexico : chaos makes cronyism look good -- When autocracy fails : banking and politics in Mexico since 1982 -- Inflation machines : banking and state finance in imperial Brazil -- The democratic consequences of inflation-tax banking in Brazil -- Traveling to other places : is our sample representative? -- Reality is a plague on many houses
Dimensions
22 cm.
Extent
xi, 570 pages
Isbn
9780691168357
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
  • ocn925526221
  • (OCoLC)925526221
  • 1512849
Label
Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit, Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 507-548) and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
If stable and efficient banks are such a good idea, why are they so rare? -- The game of bank bargains -- Tools of conquest and survival : why states need banks -- Privileges with burdens : war, empire, and the monopoly structure of English banking -- Banks and democracy : Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -- Crippled by populism : U.S. banking from colonial times to 1990 -- The new U.S. bank bargain : megabanks, urban activists, and the erosion of mortgage standards -- Leverage, regulatory failure, and the subprime crisis -- Durable partners : politics and banking in Canada -- Mexico : chaos makes cronyism look good -- When autocracy fails : banking and politics in Mexico since 1982 -- Inflation machines : banking and state finance in imperial Brazil -- The democratic consequences of inflation-tax banking in Brazil -- Traveling to other places : is our sample representative? -- Reality is a plague on many houses
Dimensions
22 cm.
Extent
xi, 570 pages
Isbn
9780691168357
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
  • ocn925526221
  • (OCoLC)925526221
  • 1512849

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